Gendered Partisanship in the U.S. House of Representatives

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The United States Congress has changed in two significant ways over the past two decades: there has been an increase in partisan polarization and in the number of women elected. Scholars have devoted considerable attention to each of these changes in isolation but have yet to explore the important connections between them. In this project, I begin to fill this significant gap in scholarship by developing and testing a theory of "gendered partisanship" that explains the closely interwoven relationship between these changes. My analysis is based on a systematic study of congresswomen's strategic responses to increasing partisan polarization and changing institutional rules, gender stereotypes, and the pursuit of power inside the House of Representatives from 1987-2012. I find that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, congresswomen often demonstrated less loyalty than their male counterparts, particularly Republicans, all else equal. By the mid-1990s, the gender gap closed, and congresswomen have begun to express more party loyalty than their male colleagues.

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The United States Congress has changed in two significant ways over the past twenty years: there has been an increase in partisan polarization and in the number of women elected. Scholars have devoted considerable attention to analyzing each of these changes in isolation but have yet to explore the important connections between them. In this project, I develop and begin to test a theory of *gendered partisanship* that explains the interaction of gender dynamics with parties and institutions in the House of Representatives.

Although all member of Congress have incentives to respond strategically to an increasingly partisan institution in which party leaders wield considerable power, gendered partisanship takes into account gender-based incentives as well. Congresswomen also face gender stereotypes held by the electorate and other members of Congress that shape expectations that they are weaker partisans and weaker leaders (or that their behavior is less partisan and less agentic) than are congressmen, along with the legacy of bipartisan cooperation among congresswomen in earlier periods. As members of Congress are increasingly rewarded for their partisan behavior, congresswomen in the House have incentives to take extra steps to prove their partisan credentials. Today's Republican congresswomen must also counter the stereotype that they are more liberal than their male counterparts, as indeed was the case among Republican congresswomen during the 1990s.

I analyze differences between congressmen and congresswomen, by party, from 1987 to the present. Widespread gender stereotypes, and much of the literature on women and politics, maintain that female leaders are more cooperative and less assertive than men, leading to implicit and explicit expectations that an increase in congresswomen should be accompanied by increased cooperation and civility in Congress. By contrast, I expect that congresswomen's behavior in the most recent House sessions is even more partisan than congressmen's is, as

gendered partisanship leads to sex differences in partisan behavior, with congresswomen taking extra steps to prove their partisan credentials in their legislative activity and party fundraising.

I test these predictions about sex differences using data about members' party loyalty in voting, discharge petition activity, partisan rhetoric in congressional speech, and party fundraising in Congress. These preliminary analyses offer some support for gendered partisanship. I find that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, congresswomen often demonstrated less loyalty than their male counterparts, particularly Republicans, all else equal. By the mid-1990s, the gender gap closed, and congresswomen have begun to express more party loyalty than their male colleagues. The analysis provides additional insight into scholars' understanding of gender dynamics in Congress and the effects of partisan polarization and institutional rules on legislative behavior.

Political Background

The gender diversity of the U.S. Congress has increased considerably in the past three decades, although women remain significantly underrepresented, comprising only 19 percent of the House and 20 percent of the Senate in 2015. Between 1989 and 2015, the number of women in the House increased from 29 to 84 and the number of women in the Senate increased from 2 to 20. The biggest increase in congresswomen occurred in 1992, often referred to as the "Year of the Woman," when the number of women in the House nearly doubled from 28 to 47 and the number of women in the Senate increased from 3 to 6. The increases in congresswomen have been small but steady in the election cycles that have followed.

As Figure 1 reveals, the growth in congresswomen is occurring disproportionately among Democrats. In the 100th Congress (1987-1988), the parties were near parity: the percentage of all congresswomen who were Democrats was 55%. By the 111th Congress (2009-2010), Democrats'

share of all women in the House and Senate grew to a record 77%, dipping to 68% in the 112th Congress (2011-2012) and rising to 75% in the 113th Congress (2013-14). The analyses that follow will shed some light on the large partisan gap.

[Figure 1 about here]

The increase in congresswomen has been considerably slower than women's gains in other professions. Inside Congress, women remain largely outsiders in a male-dominated institution. Indeed, scholars have argued that Congress is a gendered institution (Rosenthal 2002, Duerst-Lahti 2002) and scholars and politicians alike have provided examples of gendered, and race-gendered, bias on the part of some congressmen against congresswomen (e.g., Hawkesworth 2003, Boxer 1993; Foerstel and Foerstel 1996; Margolies-Mezvinsky 1994). These dynamics may give congresswomen incentives to work with one another frequently, including across party lines, but they may also provide congresswomen with additional incentives to prove themselves to their male colleagues, especially their fellow partisans.

Scholarship on women in legislatures emphasizes gender—but not partisan—differences in legislative style and substance. Research suggests that congresswomen are better at building consensus than congressmen and that electing more women will change not only policies but transform the legislative process itself (e.g., Flamang 1985; Gelb and Palley 1996; Kathlene 1994). Research analyzing congresswomen's legislative activities before Republicans gained control of Congress in 1994 found that Democratic and Republican congresswomen alike were more likely than their male counterparts to vote for and sponsor issues of importance to women such as child care, women's health, access to abortion, domestic violence prevention, and pay equity (Burrell 1994; Dodson and Carroll 1991; Dodson 1995; Dodson 2006; Gelb and Palley 1996; Norton 1999; Swers 1998, 2002; Thomas 1994).

Scholarly work on women in legislatures, however, does not generally account for the effects of institutional and partisan imperatives on congresswomen's behavior and ambition. A notable exception is Swers (2002), who finds that Republican congresswomen respond to the Republican takeover of Congress by demonstrating increased partisanship in the 104th Congress (1995-1996) compared to the 103rd Congress (1993-1994).

In January 2007, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) became the first woman Speaker of the House, presiding over a chamber that was 84 percent male. Her victory was heralded as an accomplishment for women and for Democrats, as the 2006 elections catapulted her from Minority Leader to Speaker. Presiding as Speaker during an era of powerful party leaders and heightened partisan polarization, Pelosi wielded more power—i.e., she had more tools and prerogatives—than her Democratic predecessors, giving her significant influence over the legislative agenda and the careers of rank-and-file members. As Speaker for four years and as Minority Leader, Pelosi embodies many of the strong partisan traits typical of recent leaders: support for partisan policy initiatives, fundraising prowess, willingness to exclude the other party from decision-making, and relentless attacks on Republicans. Pelosi's public leadership, however, is at odds with the consensus-oriented style described by many scholars as typical of female leaders, underscoring the significant questions about the effects of changing partisan and institutional incentives on congresswomen in particular.

A Theory of Gendered Partisanship

Gender stereotypes suggest that female leaders exhibit communal behavior while male leaders are more likely to possess leadership traits and be assertive and agentic (e.g., Alexander and Andersen 1993; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Eagley and Karau 2002). Indeed, past scholarship on women in legislatures leads to the prediction that an increase in congresswomen

should increase cooperative behavior inside the institution (e.g., Kathlene 1994, Duerst-Lahti 2002; Gelb and Palley 1996). Some of this literature focuses on consensus-building by women; other works cites congresswomen's demonstrated record of support for women's issues and work across party lines to put women's issues on the agenda in conjunction with the Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues in the early 1990s (Dodson 2006; Gertzog 2004).

However, institutional forces in Congress are powerful in shaping members' incentives and behavior. Partisanship in Congress and the polarization between the two parties have risen dramatically in recent decades (e.g., Rhode 1991; Aldrich and Rohde 1998, 2000; Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Theriault 2008). Narrow margins and increased ideological polarization between the parties have translated into high levels of partisan conflict and a breakdown in bipartisan cooperation among members. In the majoritarian House, majority party leaders attain 218 votes by working with their own members rather than forming cross-party coalitions.

In the contemporary House of Representatives, institutional rules limit the prerogatives of individual members. Members have ceded considerable power to party leaders in the contemporary House of Representatives since the 1970s (e.g., Rohde 1991; Sinclair 2002). Republican leaders' further centralized their power with a series of reforms during their twelve years in the majority, and to the surprise of political observers, Democratic leaders kept many of the GOP innovations intact (Pearson and Schickler 2009b). When party leaders allocate scarce resources such as committee assignments, legislative opportunities, and campaign funds, they pick and choose between their members based on party loyalty, thereby setting up a strong reward system for partisan behavior (Pearson forthcoming). Rank-and-file members also use these criteria when casting their votes for party leaders. Thus members pursuing power in committees or in the leadership have strong incentives to support the party in any way they can.

As members of Congress wage partisan warfare as members of two distinct teams, and as members are rewarded for their partisan behavior—behavior that includes voting with the party on votes that divide the parties, fundraising for the party, and attacking the other party—congresswomen have additional incentives to prove their partisan credentials than congressmen that stem from *gendered partisanship*.

Gendered partisanship refers to congresswomen's strategic response to increasing partisanship in Congress and the electorate. Gendered partisanship leads congresswomen to go above and beyond all members' strategic responses to increasing partisanship, as congresswomen take into account the significant gender dynamics that have shaped expectations about their behavior, including specific stereotypes held by the electorate and members of Congress about congresswomen and the legacy of bipartisan cooperation among congresswomen. This causes sex differences—in both degree and kind—in members' strategic reactions to increasing partisan polarization in Congress. The institutional forces that drive, in part, gendered partisanship have given congresswomen even more incentives than in the past to outshine congressmen when it comes to their partisan behavior. As party leaders' powers have increased during the post-reform era, so have congresswomen's incentives to express loyalty.

Republican congresswomen have even stronger incentives than Democratic congresswomen to demonstrate support for their party over and above their male colleagues. Research on gender stereotypes shows that congresswomen are viewed as more liberal than congressmen are, regardless of their actual voting records (McDermott 1997, King and Matland 2003). Indeed, GOP Congresswomen trying to advance within the party must contend with the legacy of long-serving moderate GOP congresswomen who often defected from their party or

worked across party lines, such as former Republican Congresswomen Nancy Johnson (CT), Marge Roukema (NJ), Connie Morella (MD), and Sue Kelly (NY).

For Democratic women, the gender stereotype that women are more liberal than men may be helpful at times. Indeed, in Democratic congressional primaries since 1998, where Democratic voters tend to be, on average, more liberal than Democratic voters in the general election, women have won at a higher rate than men (Lawless and Pearson 2008). Yet when it comes to voting on the House floor, does this assumed liberalism decrease the value of Democratic congresswomen's support for the party in the eyes of party leaders? And while being labeled a liberal may help Democratic women win favor with party leaders, Democratic women still must contend with gender stereotypes that suggest women are less likely to possess leadership traits and less likely to attack the other party.

Women have a long history of significant underrepresentation in politics, which, despite recent gains, persists in Congress today. Congresswomen's incentives to demonstrate their party loyalty are consistent with their incentives to be particularly active participants in the legislative process in general. Support for the idea that congresswomen work harder than congressmen for strategic reasons is well documented in other domains. Anzia and Berry (2011) show that congresswomen are more likely to bring federal dollars back to their districts and to sponsor bills than congressmen. Pearson and Dancey (2009) find that congresswomen are significantly more likely to deliver one-minute speeches and speeches during legislative debate on the House floor than congressmen are.

Research on congressional elections and candidate emergence shows that new congresswomen arrive on Capitol Hill having already taken extra steps to get there. Women are more concerned with their legitimacy as candidates and likelihood of victory than men (Lawless

and Fox 2005; Dodson 1998; Fowler and McClure 1989; Fulton et al. 2006; Sanbonmatsu 2002). These concerns translate into gender differences in congressional candidacies: while women running for Congress win congressional elections at the same rate as men, non-incumbent women running from 1984-2006 have more electoral experience and raise more money than men (Pearson and McGhee 2013). In general, women candidates raise as much, or more, money than their male counterparts (Burrell 1994, 1998; Cook, Thomas and Wilcox 1994; Fox 2006). The incentives for women to prove themselves in an institution where men are the norm only increase once they arrive, and proving their partisan credentials is particularly important in today's polarized era.

Data, Measures, and Hypotheses

I have created a new dataset of all members of the House from 1987 to 2012 that includes their demographic, district, and institutional information, along with election outcomes, campaign spending, and district presidential vote. The data span the decades when the number of women in Congress and partisan polarization increased most rapidly. In this section, I present an overview of the data and outline my hypotheses.

Members can express party loyalty in several ways, and as party line voting has risen and partisan conflict has intensified, members and leaders have become more creative in contributing to the party's policy, political, and electoral success. The data captures several forms of members' partisan behavior: party voting on the House floor, leadership PAC and campaign contributions to other same-party House candidates, contributions to the party campaign committee, partisan speech on the House floor, and discharge petition activity.

Roll Call Voting Loyalty

An obvious litmus test of loyalty is the rate at which members vote in favor of legislation supported by the majority party and opposed by the minority party on the House floor. To pass their legislative program (and to avoid embarrassment), the majority party needs 218 of 435 votes. I capture members' support in voting with scores compiled by *Congressional Quarterly.* At the end of each year, *CQ Weekly* publishes members' party unity scores, consisting of the percentage of votes in which a member of Congress votes with his or her party on roll call votes where the majority of each party opposes the majority of the another, adjusted for participation so that the score is calculated from the votes actually cast.

During this time period, the average level of members' party loyalty in roll call voting increased significantly in both parties. Republicans' loyalty averaged only 72% in 1989, compared to a peak of 91% in 1995, 2001, and 2003. Democrats' unity averaged only 79% in 1992, compared to record high averages of 92% in both 2007 and 2008 and 91% in 2009 under the leadership of Speaker Pelosi. As members' average loyalty increases, the standard deviations decrease: members are increasingly clustered at the loyal end of the continuum with less room to increase their loyalty in voting.

Discharge Petition Loyalty

Discharge petitions pose a threat to majority party leaders' agenda control, potentially enabling a simple majority of members to overcome party leaders' ability to block legislation from reaching the floor (Crombez, Groseclose, and Krehbiel 2006). If 218 members sign a discharge petition, the bill (or resolution) specified on the petition is considered on the House floor, after a vote, under the terms on the petition. Although the discharge process is

cumbersome and not often successful (see Cox and McCubbins 2005), it provides an opportunity for a determined, cross-party majority to overcome majority party leaders' (or committee) gatekeeping.

Until 1993, the names of the petition signatories were only made public in the 48 cases in which a petition reached 218 signatures and was printed in the *Congressional Record.* As a result of a successful discharge petition drive led by James Inhofe (R-OK), discharge petitions were made public 1993. Democratic leaders strongly opposed the rules change, but Inhofe and his allies leaked signatories the press, who pressured additional members to sign. During the era in which discharge petitions were public (1993-present), three discharge petitions reached 218 signatures over the objections of majority party leaders and without the support of a majority of the majority party.

Despite their infrequent success, discharge petitions pose a threat to majority party leaders and their control over the agenda. For majority party members, signing a discharge petition is therefore a sign of disloyalty. To measure support for leaders' agenda control, or *discharge petition loyalty*, I collected every discharge petition filed from 1993 to 2012 and coded their signatories (see Pearson and Schickler 2009a).[1] The data come from the House clerk's office website.[2] In the analysis that follows, I calculate discharge petition loyalty using the percentage of petitions in a Congress that a majority party member does not sign, with a score of 100 indicating that a member did not try to circumvent leaders' agenda control by signing any petitions. For minority party members, discharge petition loyalty is the percentage of petitions a member *does* sign, bolstering the minority party's effort to bring their bills to the floor.

[1] Discharge petitions from 1989 – 1992 are unavailable because they were not public when members signed them. Thirty years after the end of the Congress in which they were filed they will be available at the National Archives.
[2] http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/index.html

Rhetorical Party Loyalty

Floor speeches provide members of Congress with opportunities to enhance their own party's reputation and criticize the other party and engage in partisan battles on the House floor. One-minute speeches in particular provide members opportunities to demonstrate their commitment to their party. Unlike in the Senate, known for its rules allowing unlimited debate on any topic, opportunities for House members to speak on the floor are somewhat limited, particularly opportunities for members to speak about whatever they choose. Legislating in the House is governed by special rules that set strict time limits on debate on major legislation and, increasingly often, on the number of amendments that members may offer. Members' opportunities to speak out about topics of their choice, *e.g.*, offering commentary on politics, policy, or on issues of importance to their constituents, are therefore often confined to one-minute speeches, morning hour, and special orders. I focus on one minute speeches because they occur at the beginning of most legislative days. They are not subject to gatekeeping, any member may seek recognition to "make a speech on a subject of his or her choice not exceeding one minute in duration" (Dreier 1999). The Speaker determines how many one minutes to allow, usually informing both party's leaders in advance, and the order in which members arrive determine when and whether they speak.

Because one-minute speeches occur at the beginning of each legislative day, members, staff, and leaders are likely to either be on the House floor following a vote on the previous day's journal or in their offices watching C-SPAN for information about the legislative day ahead. One-minutes have become known for members' frequent partisan attacks. In recent years, party leaders have taken an active role in coordinating one minutes. The "Republican Theme Team" and the "Democratic Message Group" recruit members to deliver one minutes on an issue

designated as the party's daily message (Harris 2005; Schneider 2003). Republican leader John Boehner (R-OH), for example, used his website to post a partisan "one-minute speech of the day" in the 110th Congress (2007-2008).[3]

Congressional observers, and even some members, have criticized one minutes because they start the day off with a partisan tone. A 1997 report by Kathleen Hall Jamieson, "Civility in the House of Representatives," recommended that the House either eliminate one minutes or move them to the end of the day. A bipartisan group of over fifty members of Congress sent letters to the Speaker in the 104th, 105th, and 106th Congresses to complain that one minutes had become "a series [of] soundbite assaults . . . highly conducive to the kind of attacks that used to be reserved for campaign commercials" (Schneider 2003). Reformers have not been successful in their attempts to curb one-minutes.

Previous studies of one-minute speeches find that members who are disadvantaged in the institution, such as junior members, minority party members, "backbenchers," non-committee chairs, and congresswomen are most likely to take advantage of unconstrained time (Maltzman and Sigelman 1996; Morris 2001; Rocca 2007; Pearson and Dancey 2011).

Because these speeches give members opportunities to prove their partisan credentials above and beyond their voting record, I use them to create a measure of members' *rhetorical party loyalty.* I collected data on every one-minute speech in from Congress from 1989 to 2012 for this analysis. The *Congressional Record* is available online, but it must be downloaded into text files and separated by member to determine how many speeches members give and to run the content analysis programs for each member's speeches. I used a content analysis program, Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count, or LIWC, developed by James Pennebaker and colleagues (Pennebaker, Francis, and Booth 2003). LIWC is a word-based count system that works through

[3] For an example, see: http://gopleader.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=67402.

a set of specific "dictionaries" that are applied to a given text. I created dictionary categories that enabled LIWC to capture mentions of the word, or forms of or other references to, Democrat and Republican.[4] If a member mentioned either party or a related word, a research assistant read the entire speech and coded it as negative in tone, positive in tone, neutral in tone, or unrelated to either party. I then generated separate counts for each member of the number of speeches that are primarily negative about the other party and primarily positive about one's own party, and then I combined the measures into an overall measure of each member's rhetorical party loyalty.

The following one-minute speech by Congresswoman Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) illustrates a partisan speech attacking the other party.

> Mr. Speaker, I would like to pose a question today, a question for the majority leadership of this House. My constituents are asking me, how high does the price of gasoline have to go before the Democrat leadership of this House decides to vote to allow domestic energy production? How much are Americans going to have to pay before they will bring our bills to the floor to address this issue? They are wanting to know. They also want to know why no refineries have been built since 1976. They want to know why permits seem to be slow walked when it comes to exploring for natural resources. Today, my constituents in Memphis, Tennessee, are paying $3.63 for one gallon of gasoline. That's nearly 55 percent more than they were paying when Speaker *Pelosi* took over. The American people are wanting answers. And what is the energy solution that the Democratic leadership has offered? Well, it has been banning the traditional light bulb. Americans want answers, Mr. Speaker, but even more, they want some action. They want the problem solved. (*Congressional Record* H4159, May 20, 2008)

Fundraising Loyalty

Party leaders look to their members for assistance in pursuing electoral gains, and they have incentives to reward their loyal fundraisers. Majority party status means everything in the House. Most members of Congress represent relatively safe districts and face weak challengers,

[4] These terms included: Republican, Republicans, GOP, minority, majority, aisle, Democrat, Democrats, and Democratic.

and so they do not have incentives to raise large sums of money for their own campaigns above and beyond what is necessary to ward off potential challengers. This poses a collective action problem—why should members in safe districts spend their time fundraising for other candidates when they will still share in the benefits of majority party status? In the 104th Congress, following a 52 seat party switch and a change in the majority party, leaders of both parties recognized that majority control was up for grabs, hinging on the election outcomes in a handful of districts.

Party leaders provided incentives—and directives, with party campaign committee dues of over $100,000—to help overcome this collective action problem. Leaders regard members' campaign contributions as an expression of party loyalty above and beyond supporting the party position in roll call votes. Generally requiring more effort than voting with one's party on a special rule or bill, raising money for the party began to set members apart from colleagues whose party loyalty was expressed only in their voting record. As members and leaders adopted larger roles as financiers of their colleagues' campaigns, vulnerable members turned to congressional campaign committees, party leaders and their colleagues for increased assistance.

Contributions to Party Congressional Campaign Committees

Increasingly, party leaders encourage their members to help raise funds for the party's marginal candidates in the upcoming elections (Kolodny 1998; Sabato and Larson 2002; Cann 2008). Many members' contributions exceed leaders' requests, especially contributions from rank-and-file members with ambitions of being a committee chair or future leader (Cann 2008). Congressional campaign committees contribute money to congressional candidates in the form of direct contributions and coordinated expenditures. Although less common, they may also make independent expenditures on behalf of candidates provided these are not coordinated with

the candidates. Congressional campaign committees also provide a variety of resources to help candidates, include staff, recruitment, research, polling, communications, fundraising assistance, and grass-roots activities. Such activities are also reported to the FEC as in-kind contributions.

Leadership PACs

Members of Congress and other elected officials began to form leadership PACs in the 1980s (Baker 1989; Corrado 1997), although members were already contributing to fellow partisans.[5] Leadership PACs are unique because members of Congress and other elected officials—not outside groups such as unions, trade associations, or ideological interest groups—form them to contribute to up to $10,000 per cycle ($5,000 in the primary and $5,000 in the general) to their colleagues and would-be colleagues. Initially, the scope of leadership PACs was minimal, but with every new cycle more members form them. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, 38 members of Congress had leadership PACs in 1994. During the 1997-1998 cycle, elected officials operated 116 leadership PACs, including 51 by House members (Heberlig 2000), with Democratic House candidates receiving $2,600,000 and Republican House candidates $5,996,000 from this source (Herrnson 2000). Just two years later, in the 106th Congress, the total number of leadership PACs had grown to 141, 71 of which were formed by House members.[6] During this 1999-2000 cycle, the total contribution level from leadership PACs reached $15,657,988, compared to $10,853,360 in the previous cycle, although not all of this leadership PAC money originated from or went to House members. Like making a contribution to the party's congressional campaign committee, forming a leadership PAC allows members to express their party loyalty in a competitive environment.

Member-to-Member Contributions

[5] In 1978, Congressman Henry Waxman (D-CA) contributed to many fellow Commerce Committee Democrats and unseated a senior colleague as chairman of the Health and Environment subcommittee.
[6] Based on my calculations from data available from the Center for Responsive Politics.

An increasing number of members of Congress, particularly those from safe seats, help fellow members with contributions of up to $1000 per election from their own campaign funds. Party leaders encourage members to contribute from their campaigns to their colleagues' races, as well as to the congressional campaign committee, strengthening the relationship between the party-in-government and the congressional party organization (Sabato and Larson 2002).

I analyze these three types of fundraising separately: contributions members make from their personal campaigns to other House candidates of their party; contributions members make from their personal campaigns to their party congressional campaign committee (*i.e.*, the DCCC or NRCC); and contributions members make from their own leadership PAC. I obtained data from the Federal Election Commission for the 1988-1990 election cycles and from the Center for Responsive Politics for the 1992-2012 election cycles. Specifically, I calculated every contribution made from incumbents to candidates running in the general election for the House of Representatives (which includes incumbents, challengers and open seat candidates, analyzed separately) and to the party's congressional campaign committee and national committee. I also collected data on every member of Congress' leadership PAC contributions to general election candidates and party committees.

Because women face gender stereotypes that suggest that they will be more cooperative and less aggressive than men, gendered partisanship leads to the expectation that congresswomen in the House will go to greater lengths than men to prove their partisan credentials with their voting records, fundraising for the party, and partisan speeches. Specifically, I test the following hypotheses:

H1: Congresswomen express more roll call voting loyalty than congressmen, voting more often with their party than congressmen all else equal, and this gap increases over time.

H2: Majority party congresswomen are less likely, and minority party congresswomen are more likely, to sign discharge petitions than their male colleagues, and this gap increases over time.

H3: Congresswomen give more partisan speeches—especially speeches attacking the other party--than their male colleagues, and this gap increases over time.

H4: Congresswomen raise more money for their colleagues and party than congressmen, and this gap increases over time.

Results

Roll Call Voting Loyalty

Gendered partisanship shapes congresswomen's incentives to toe the party line above and beyond their male colleagues when it comes to voting on the House floor. The means presented in Figure 2 suggest that there are indeed sex differences in party line voting that change over time.

[Figure 2 about here]

In the 100th and 101st Congress, men in both party were more likely to vote with their party than women were. By 1991, Democratic women vote more frequently with their party than men, and the gap widens over time. From 1991 to 2012, Democratic women are between 2 and 9 points more loyal than Democratic men.

Republican women lag behind Democratic women and Republican men in their loyalty from the 100th to the 108th Congress. In the 111th and 112th Congress, Republican congresswomen vote with their party more often than congressmen. The dramatic increase in Republican congresswomen's party loyalty is striking. In the 101st Congress, Republican women voted with their party 59 percent of the time, compared Republican men's 77 percent. In the 103rd Congress, GOP congresswomen's average rose to 76 percent. After Republicans took

control of Congress, Republican women's average rose to 89 percent, and it has not returned to 1993-1994 levels since then, remaining at 89 percent or above in all Congresses except the 106th.

Many factors predict a member's party loyalty in voting, perhaps most notably a member's district concerns. And congresswomen and congressmen do not come from the same types of districts. Congresswomen are more likely to represent liberal, urban, and well-educated districts than congressmen (Palmer and Simon 2009). In the multivariate analyses predicting party unity that follow, I therefore control for a member's district partisanship, captured by his or her party's presidential candidate's vote share in the district. I also control for the number of terms a member has served. I include interaction terms for women and Congress to assess the marginal effect of being a woman on a member's party loyalty in any given Congress. I analyze Democrats and Republicans separately.

Democratic congresswomen are significantly more loyal to their party than their male counterparts are, controlling for their district, party, and length of service. The marginal effects shown in Figure 3 reveal that from the 103rd to the 109th Congress and in the 112th Congress, the marginal effect of being a congresswomen on party loyalty in voting is statistically significant and positive. The results for Democratic women are never negative.

[Figure 3 about here]

Perhaps most interesting are the partisan differences. While Democratic women consistently vote with the party at an equal, or significantly higher rate, than Democratic men, Republican women undergo dramatic changes over time, as seen in Figure 4. Republican women are significantly less loyal to their party than Republican men in the 100th – 103rd Congress. However, by the 104th Congress, there is no statistical difference in the marginal effect of being a congresswoman. From the 104th to the 110th Congress there is no difference in women and

men's loyalty, excepting the 106th Congress, where women are less loyal. In the 111th Congress, congresswomen vote with the party more often, all else equal. The full results of both models are presented in Table 1 in the Appendix.

[Figure 4 about here]

An important next step is assessing the degree to which this change is a function of replacement and how much of it is a result of conversion, whereby individual congresswomen are becoming more loyal over time. The data reveal that the more recently elected Republican women are more conservative, and vote with the party more often, than the Republican women of the past. But it is also the case that majority party status, combined with partisan pressures, resulted in increasing loyalty from some GOP congresswomen over time, including Connie Morella (R-MD), Nancy Johnson (R-CT), and Marge Roukema (R-NJ).

Discharge Petition Loyalty

Discharge petitions anger majority party leaders. Since they became publically available in 1993, however, majority party members of Congress have faced not only pressure from party leaders not to sign them, but also countervailing pressure from interest groups and the public to sign them, in some instances. Minority party members are much more likely to sign discharge petitions, sometimes at the behest of party leaders. Majority party members rarely sign discharge petitions from 1993 on, ranging from a high average of 4 percent of petitions signed by majority-party Republicans in the 104th Congress to a low average of 0.0022 percent of petitions signed by majority-party Democrats in the 110th Congress. The increase in minority party signature activity during this time, however, is striking. In the 103rd Congress, minority party Republicans signed, on average, 46% of discharge petitions, and in the 104th Congress, minority party Democrats

only signed an average of 13% of petitions. By the 106th Congress, discharge petition activity sharply increased, with members filing more and signing more as Democrats adjusted to life in the minority party. On average, Democrats signed 73% of the petitions filed in the 106th Congress, while only seven Republicans signed any. Only twenty-one Republicans signed a discharge petitions in the 109th Congress, and only eight Republicans signed more than one petition. By contrast, the average Democrat signed 13 of the 18 petitions filed in the 109th Congress.

To analyze whether congresswomen demonstrate more party loyalty in their discharge petition activity, I employ multivariate OLS analyses of the percentage of discharge petitions signed from 1993 to 2012. For majority party members, discharge loyalty is the percentage of petitions not signed. For minority party members, discharge petition loyalty is the percentage of petitions signed. I include interaction terms for women and Congress to assess the marginal effect of being a woman on a member's party loyalty in any given Congress. I control for the number of terms a member has served, their party's most recent district presidential vote, and membership on the Rules Committee. I expect that members who have served longer and thus have more institutional loyalty, along with majority party Rules Committee members, who are the most frequent targets of discharge petition efforts, will be less likely to sign. I also expect those with more voters of the opposite party will be more likely to buck the party.

The results differ by party, as shown in Figures 5 and 6. Among Democrats, the marginal effect of being a congresswoman was significant and positive in the 105th -109th Congress, meaning that congresswomen signed more petitions than men while in the minority. Republican congresswomen demonstrated significantly less loyalty in the 103rd Congress, signing fewer than GOP men in the minority, and no difference from the 104th – 110th Congress. By the 111th

Congress, Republican women demonstrated more discharge petition loyalty, signing more petitions in the minority. Thus, the gender differences among Democrats and Republicans reflect proactive petition activity on the part of minority-party congresswomen in which they had to initiate petitions or seek out petitions to sign. The full results of both models are presented in Table 2 in the Appendix.

[Figures 5 and 6 about here]

Rhetorical Party Loyalty

One-minute speeches have become a venue for members of Congress to attack the other party and praise one's own party in front of one's colleagues, leaders, and a C-SPAN audience alike. Consistently giving partisan speeches may enhance one's reputation as a team player and damage the possibility of forging bipartisan relationships. Partisan rhetoric pervades the contemporary Congress. As Figure 7 and 8 indicate, attacks against the other party were particularly prevalent among Republicans in the 103rd and 110th, two Congresses controlled by Democratic majorities, and among Democrats in the 104th, 105th, and 109th Congresses, all controlled by Republicans. Even as members, especially Democrats, were more likely to attack the other party than defend their own, members nonetheless lauded their own party's accomplishments. Members' were least partisan in the 107th Congress—likely because of the 9/11 attacks.

In the 110th Congress, for example, members gave anywhere from 0 (114 members) to 211 one minutes. Congresswomen were more likely to give one-minute speeches: congressmen gave 7.99 speeches and congresswomen gave 10.57 speeches. In this analysis, however, I am interested in only the number of partisan one-minute speeches members give, not the overall

number of speeches. At the bivariate level, there is no real sex difference among Democrats. Congressmen averaged 1.8 and congresswomen averaged 1.5 speeches in support of the party and .79 and .65 speeches attacking Republicans, respectively. There were striking sex differences among Republicans, however, in partisan speechmaking. Republican congresswomen gave, on average, 4.2 speeches attacking Democrats and 1.95 speeches praising Republicans, while Republican congressmen gave only 1.2 speeches attacking Democrats and .63 speeches in support of their party. Representative Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) led the House in the number of partisan one-minutes.

[Figures 7 and 8 about here]

Figures 7 and 8 also reveal striking bivariate sex differences. Democratic women are consistently more likely to give partisan speeches than Democratic congressmen throughout this time period, and the speeches are more likely to be negative (anti-Republican) than positive (pro-Democratic). Republican women are less likely to give partisan speeches until the 108th Congress, when Republican women give more speeches criticizing Democrats than their male colleagues.

I analyze partisan speechmaking in every Congress using multivariate regression analysis. In this analysis, I run the models separately by party and analyze the number of speeches each member gives that attack the other party and defend one's own party separately. I include interaction terms for women and Congress to assess the marginal effect of being a woman on a member's party loyalty in any given Congress. In addition, I include controls for seniority, district presidential vote for the party, electoral safety as measured by *CQ Weekly*, and a measure members' ideological extremity, the absolute value of his or her DW-NOMINATE score. Members who represent districts with a sizable share of constituents who identify with the

other party and members who are electorally vulnerable should be less likely to attack the opposing party for risk of offending their other-party constituents. These members may be just as likely to defend their own party, so I do not necessarily expect that these variables will depress partisan speechmaking in the models predicting positive in-party speechmaking. Previous research has found that ideologically extreme members are more likely to give one minute speeches.

Figures 9 and 10 show the marginal effect of being a Democratic woman on rhetorical loyalty in each Congress. In most Congresses—all but the 105th and 109th Congresses--Democratic congresswomen were no more or less likely to deliver positive, pro-Democratic partisan speeches than congressmen. In the 105th and 109th, Democratic women gave one more pro-Democratic speech than their male colleagues. In three Congresses—the 104th, 105th, and 109th Congresses--however, Democratic women gave anywhere from 2 to 4 more negative, anti-Republican speeches than their male colleagues. Democratic men were never significantly more negative than their women colleagues.

[Figures 9 and 10 about here]

Figures 11 and 12 reveal similar patterns among Republicans. Congressmen never demonstrated significantly more rhetorical loyalty than congresswomen. In the 109th Congress, Republican congresswomen were significantly more likely to deliver a positive speech. The marginal effect of being a Republican woman amounted to three additional pro-Republican speeches. More striking, Republican women gave significantly more negative speeches—four more in the 109th Congress and five more in the 110th Congress. The most conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats are also more likely to deliver partisan speeches, consistent

with other research. What is remarkable is that gender matters above and beyond ideology in some congresses. The full results of both models are presented in Table 3 in the Appendix.

[Figures 11 and 12 about here]

I expected that congresswomen's strategic incentives to prove their partisan credentials—particularly when it comes to partisan attacks—would result in more partisan speeches. The results confirm my hypothesis when it comes to Republican women in recent Congresses, and Democratic women in three Congresses in which they were in the minority party. Republican women arguably have even more to prove than Democratic women. Democratic women have long been a loyal part of the Democratic Caucus, whereas Republican women have been, up until recently, more liberal than their male counterparts (Frederick 2009), and must visibly counter the gender stereotypes that women are more liberal, and less assertive, than men. Attacking Democrats on the House floor is arguably one of the most visible ways to do so.

Fundraising Loyalty

Figures 13 and 14 demonstrate members' fast-growing role as party fundraisers. Members' contributions, whether from their own campaigns and leadership PACs to individual members or to the congressional campaign committees, generally increased over time. In the 1988 election cycle, Democratic members gave, on average, $2,768 to other congressional candidates, $649 to the DCCC, and $5,328 from leadership PACs. By the 2002 cycle, these totals were $55,771; $13,694; and $26,297 respectively, and by the 2008 cycle they were $161,054, $28,663, and $50,585. Republican members contributed, on average, $1,693 to other congressional candidates, $22 to the NRCC, and $555 from their own leadership PACs in the 1988 cycle. By the 2002 cycle, these totals for Republicans were $60,040; $8,606; and $41,358

respectively and in 2008 they were $105,395; $13,547; and $49,016. An increase in contributions from both Republican and Democratic members occurs in the 104th and 105th Congresses, concomitant with the onset of an era of electoral uncertainty. The full results of both models are presented in Table 4 in the Appendix

[Figures 13 and 14 about here]

The gender dynamics of participation in party fundraising are not well-understood. When it comes to their own campaigns, research suggests that women perceive that it is more difficult for them to raise money than it is for men, and women therefore take extra steps to do so (Jenkins 2007). Survey evidence suggests that women in the professions most likely to lead to elected office also believe that women have a more difficult time raising money than men (Lawless and Fox 2005). Nonetheless, women raise as much—or more—money than men in their congressional campaigns (Burrell 1994, 2005; Cook, Thomas and Wilcox 1994; Fox 2006; Uhlaner and Schlozman 1986).

Gendered partisanship predicts that congresswomen will prove themselves by distributing more money to their colleagues than men do. As party money is increasingly valued and expected, congresswomen have extra incentives to raise money for the party—both to prove their partisan credentials and overcome the (erroneous) perception that women are bad at fundraising. Indeed, Speaker Nancy Pelosi proved her partisan credentials by demonstrating her fundraising prowess in her bid for the Democratic Minority Whip in 2001. Data from the Center for Responsive Politics reveal that Pelosi created "PAC to the Future" in 2000, raising $792,800 to distribute to Democratic candidates and outraising her rival Steny Hoyer (MD). In 2006, Pelosi's PAC contributed $653,500 to 88 House candidates and $10,000 to Senate candidates.

At the bivariate level, shown in Figures 13 and 14, sex differences are uneven. In some years in some categories (e.g., contributions to the party since the 108th Congress), Democratic women outpace their male colleagues. In other domains, the differences are small. Republican women, by contrast, consistently lag behind their male counterparts in average levels of contributions.

In multivariate regression analyses, I analyze members' total contributions to the party and colleagues (i.e., leadership PAC contributions, member to member contributions, and contributions to the party) to test the hypothesis that women raise more money for their colleagues and party than men do in the House in each cycle from 1988 to 2012. I include interaction terms for women and Congress to assess the marginal effect of being a woman on a member's party loyalty in any given Congress and controls for district presidential vote, having a safe seat as defined by *CQ Weekly*, and seniority. While presidential vote, seat safety, and terms are all significant predictors of contributions, the interaction of sex and Congress is not a significant predictor of fundraising loyalty in any Congress.

I hypothesized that congresswomen would fundraise more for their party than their male colleagues. While I found no evidence to support my hypothesis, the fact that women are at parity with their male colleagues may come as a surprise to some, given gender stereotypes about women's roles as fundraisers and smaller networks from which to fundraise.

Discussion and Conclusion

This initial exploration of gendered partisanship shows that over time, congresswomen have demonstrated more party loyalty than congressmen in response to the increasing power of party leaders and partisan polarization in the House of Representatives. Democratic congresswomen generally vote with their party more frequently than men do, contribute as much

money to their colleagues, are more likely to challenge Republican leaders by signing discharge petitions while in the minority, and deliver more partisan speeches on the House floor in the 104th, 105th, and 109th Congresses than congressmen.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the roll call record is consistent with the stereotype that Republican congresswomen were more liberal than Republican congressmen. For the last several years, however, I find that Republican women have been as likely as Republican men to vote with the party (see also Fredrick 2009). And in recent Congresses, Republican women have been a more consistent presence than men on the House floor promoting Republicans, and especially criticizing Democrats.

The measures of partisanship in this paper—party loyalty in roll call votes, discharge petition activity, leadership PAC contributions, party contributions, member-level contributions, and partisan speeches—are only some of the ways that members of Congress can demonstrate their partisan credentials to appeal to their colleagues and constituents alike. Another possibility is to track partisan media appearances, such as the regular back-and-forth cable news debates that occurred during the fall of 2008 between Congresswomen Michele Bachmann (R-MN) and Debbie Wasserman Schulz (D-FL).

Gendered partisanship may affect membership in congressional caucuses that have a specific effect on party leaders' ability to set the agenda. Within the House Democratic Caucus, the Blue Dog Democrats sometimes cause problems for majority Democratic Party leaders' agenda in their attempts to move policy to the right of the Democratic median. At the beginning of the 104th Congress, nearly thirty moderate and conservative Democrats formed the Blue Dog Coalition, usually referred to simply as the Blue Dogs. The Blue Dogs advocate fiscal restraint, focusing on their annual plan to balance the budget. When they formed, observers noted that

their ideological centrism and willingness to break with their party compelled both Republican and Democratic leaders take their views seriously (Rubin 1997). While their influence is nowhere near that of Senate moderates, it is worth noting that they are the closest group to Senate moderates in a Democratic-controlled Congress. Speaker Pelosi had to make several concessions to Blue Dog Democrats on issues including "pay-as-you-go" budgeting, appropriations bills and health care reform. In the 110th Congress, there were 47 Blue Dog Democrats, 6 of whom were congresswomen. Twenty-three percent of Democratic congressmen joined the Blue Dogs compared to 12 percent of Democratic congresswomen, which is a significant difference, but it is possible that constituency interests account for these differences.

On the Republican side, the Republican moderate Tuesday Group had several congresswomen during the mid-to-late 1990s (e.g., Connie Morella (R-MD), Nancy Johnson (R-CT), Sue Kelly (R-NY), Marge Roukema (R-NJ), and Tillie Fowler (R-FL). In the 111th Congress, by contrast, congresswomen were more likely to join the conservative Republican Study Group, whose members include Michele Bachmann (R-MN), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Mary Fallin (R-OK), Virginia Foxx (R-NC), Cathy McMorris-Rodgers (R-WA), Sue Myrick (R-NC), and Cynthia Lummis (R-WY). In the 112th Congress, five congresswomen joined the Tea Party Caucus, comprising eight percent of its membership – roughly the same percentage as women in the Republican Conference.

Gendered partisanship has implications for congresswomen's ability to work with one another across party lines. As members' partisan identity becomes more important, women on both sides of the aisle may think of themselves as members of a party first and give less priority to their identity with, and membership in, the Women's Caucus. Indeed, after one Republican member of the Women's Caucus campaigned for a Democratic member's opponent in the 1994

elections, the Democrat dropped out. An over-time analysis of the agenda, activities, and success of the Women's Caucus as polarization has increased would shed additional light on the effects of gendered partisanship.

Congresswomen's general lack of visibility in moderating the House agenda through caucus membership or bipartisan work differs starkly from the efforts of women in the Senate. In the 109th Congress, Senators Olympia Snowe (R-ME), Susan Collins (R-ME), and Mary Landrieu (D-LA) were among the visible, bipartisan group of senators who tried to work out a deal to prevent a Senate rules change to eliminate the use of the filibuster to prevent judicial confirmation votes, and women in the Senate were credited with forging a compromise on the budget in the 112th Congress.

Institutional changes bolstering the power of party leaders enhanced the ability of Pelosi to accrue power as Speaker. A woman majority leader in the Senate would of course be big news, just as it was in the House, but a moderate minority party congresswoman in the House would have little impact during major debates. By contrast, Senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME), wielded considerable power in her position as a minority party moderate in the same congresses. Snowe was widely viewed, for example, as the senator most likely to cooperate with Democrats to pass their agenda in the 111th Congress. During the 111th Congress, and particularly during the health care reform debate, Snowe received considerable attention from her colleagues and the media alike because of her pivotal role in determining the fate, or in shaping, major legislation. Institutional rules clearly matter, and a deeper investigation of the gendered implications of House and Senate differences is warranted.

The increase in congresswomen has coincided with the increase in partisan polarization in Congress. There is no evidence to suggest that more women are running for Congress because

the Congress is more polarized. The increase in women's candidacies has been slow, and if anything, bitter partisan battles and incentives to engage in partisan behavior may deter some women from running, particularly Republican women (see, e.g., Lawless and Fox 2008). But those women who do run for, and win House seats, engage in partisan battles as fiercely as—and often more so--than their male counterparts, exacerbating rather than ameliorating the breakdown in bipartisan cooperation and comity in the House.

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Figure 1. Women in the U.S. House of Representatives, by Party, 1987-2012



Figure 2. Avearage Party Loyalty, by Sex and Party, 1987-2012



Figure 3. Marginal Effects of Being a Democratic Woman on Party Loyalty



Figure 4. Marginal Effects of Being a Republican Woman on Party Loyalty



Figure 5. Marginal Effects of Being a Democratic Woman on Discharge Petition Loyalty



Figure 6. Marginal Effects of Being a Republican Woman on Discharge Petition Loyalty



Figure 7. Partisan Rhetoric on the House Floor, Democrats



Figure 8. Partisan Rhetoric on the House Floor, Republicans



Figure 9. Marginal Effects of Being a Democratic Woman on Positive Democratic Speeches



Figure 10. Marginal Effects of Being a Democratic Woman on Anti-Republican Speeches



Figure 11. Marginal Effects of Being a Republican Woman on Positive Republican Speeches



Figure 12. Marginal Effects of Being a Republican Woman on Anti-Democratic Speeches



Figure 13. Fundraising Loyalty by Sex, Democrats



Figure 14. Fundraising Loyalty by Sex, Republicans



Figure 15. Marginal Effects of Being a Democratic Woman on Party Fundraising



Figure 16. Marginal Effects of Being a Republican Woman on Party Fundraising



Table A1. Party Loyalty in Voting

	Democrats	Republicans
Female MC	-3.955	-14.82***
	(-1.49)	(-5.16)
101st	-4.304***	0.580
	(-5.20)	(0.59)
102nd	-4.692***	5.523***
	(-5.71)	(5.62)
103rd	-4.457***	13.57***
	(-5.22)	(13.64)
104th	-11.57***	19.00***
	(-12.48)	(19.93)
105th	-11.43***	17.41***
	(-12.27)	(18.14)
106th	-10.79***	15.04***
	(-11.59)	(15.63)
107th	-10.21***	19.28***
	(-11.08)	(20.45)
108th	-4.379***	18.74***
	(-4.72)	(20.10)
109th	-4.563***	17.39***
	(-4.87)	(18.76)
110th	1.121	13.82***
	(1.25)	(14.45)
111th	0.434	14.38***
	(0.49)	(14.53)
112th	-7.740***	19.05***
	(-7.90)	(20.26)
101st x Female MC	2.506	-2.188
	(0.70)	(-0.55)
102ndx Female MC	6.476	3.719
	(1.86)	(0.92)
103rd x Female MC	7.017*	4.005
	(2.25)	(1.03)
104th x Female MC	9.543**	10.46**
	(2.98)	(2.85)
105th x Female MC	8.913**	12.90***
	(2.84)	(3.51)
106th x Female MC	8.981**	8.867*
	(2.90)	(2.44)
107th x Female MC	9.320**	11.88***
	(3.03)	(3.30)
108th x Female MC	7.264*	14.28***
	(2.34)	(4.07)
109th x Female MC	7.257*	14.64***
	(2.36)	(4.25)
110th x Female MC	3.861	13.89***
	(1.28)	(3.95)
111th x Female MC	2.546	19.83***
	(0.83)	(5.76)
112th x Female MC	7.633*	15.00***
	(2.50)	(4.36)
Party Presidential Vote	0.427***	0.432***
	(31.94)	(19.43)
Terms	0.0941*	-0.527***
	(2.44)	(-11.38)
Constant	68.17***	53.06***
	(79.17)	(32.61)
N	2900	2701
Adj. R^2	0.35	0.39

Table A2. Discharge Petition Loyalty

	Democrats	Republicans
Female MC	-0.00191	-0.0776*
	(-0.07)	(-2.29)
104th	-0.847***	0.483***
	(-54.31)	(41.36)
105th	-0.669***	0.521***
	(-42.80)	(44.29)
106th	-0.283***	0.530***
	(-18.05)	(44.78)
107th	-0.273***	0.518***
	(-17.46)	(43.95)
108th	-0.297***	0.536***
	(-18.92)	(45.33)
109th	-0.275***	0.534***
	(-17.28)	(45.13)
110th	0.0305*	0.126***
	(1.99)	(10.32)
111th	-0.0417**	0.0478***
	(-2.77)	(3.85)
112th	-0.609***	0.507***
	(-37.02)	(43.47)
104th x Female MC	0.0122	0.0756
	(0.30)	(1.69)
105th x Female MC	0.0693	0.0702
	(1.77)	(1.56)
106th x Female MC	0.135***	0.0618
	(3.50)	(1.39)
107th x Female MC	0.129***	0.0690
	(3.37)	(1.57)
108th x Female MC	0.0887*	0.0700
	(2.29)	(1.64)
109th x Female MC	0.124**	0.0508
	(3.25)	(1.21)
110th x Female MC	-0.0136	0.103*
	(-0.37)	(2.41)
111th x Female MC	0.0230	0.248***
	(0.61)	(5.93)
112th x Female MC	-0.0466	0.0432
	(-1.24)	(1.03)
Party Presidential Vote	0.00242***	-0.000738*
	(9.18)	(-2.35)
Terms	-0.00132	-0.00473***
	(-1.73)	(-7.20)
Rules	0.0127	0.0106
	(0.61)	(0.80)
Constant	0.835***	0.530***
	(45.52)	(27.18)
N	2146	2171
Adj. R^2	0.774	0.764

Table A3. Rhetorical Party Loyalty

	Democrats		Republicans	
	Pro-Democrat	Anti-Republican	Pro-Republican	Anti-Democrat
Female MC	0.385	0.412	0.258	-0.217
	(0.57)	(0.32)	(0.23)	(-0.16)
102nd	-0.0371	0.0255	0.512	0.928
	(-0.16)	(0.06)	(1.22)	(1.86)
103rd	0.181	0.827	1.817***	2.897***
	(0.76)	(1.81)	(4.33)	(5.77)
104th	0.174	2.739***	1.117**	-0.439
	(0.68)	(5.58)	(2.76)	(-0.91)
105th	0.440	1.453**	0.137	-0.838
	(1.71)	(2.95)	(0.34)	(-1.71)
106th	-0.0464	0.400	0.692	-0.969*
	(-0.18)	(0.81)	(1.68)	(-1.96)
107th	-0.424	-0.182	-0.727	-1.734***
	(-1.66)	(-0.37)	(-1.80)	(-3.60)
108th	-0.256	0.415	-0.894*	-1.927***
	(-1.00)	(0.84)	(-2.22)	(-4.01)
109th	0.139	1.531**	-0.665	-1.757***
	(0.54)	(3.07)	(-1.66)	(-3.66)
110th	1.712***	0.828	-0.930*	-0.610
	(6.84)	(1.72)	(-2.16)	(-1.18)
111th	0.0652	0.454	-0.0402	0.800
	(0.26)	(0.96)	(-0.09)	(1.52)
112th	0.0263	2.188***	-1.177**	-2.915***
	(0.10)	(4.21)	(-2.72)	(-5.63)
102nd x Female MC	0.00514	-0.734	-0.580	-0.910
	(0.01)	(-0.41)	(-0.35)	(-0.46)
103rd x Female MC	-0.324	-0.0414	-0.0283	-0.313
	(-0.40)	(-0.03)	(-0.02)	(-0.16)
104th x Female MC	0.195	3.648*	1.123	1.764
	(0.23)	(2.28)	(0.75)	(0.99)
105th x Female MC	0.933	1.765	-0.591	0.394
	(1.15)	(1.13)	(-0.41)	(0.23)
106th x Female MC	-0.136	0.573	-1.307	-0.198
	(-0.17)	(0.37)	(-0.89)	(-0.11)
107th x Female MC	-0.266	-0.443	-0.0358	0.542
	(-0.33)	(-0.29)	(-0.02)	(0.31)
108th x Female MC	-0.416	-0.456	0.169	0.757
	(-0.51)	(-0.29)	(0.12)	(0.45)
109th x Female MC	0.915	1.200	2.786*	4.327**
	(1.14)	(0.78)	(2.01)	(2.60)
110th x Female MC	-0.825	-1.033	0.977	4.822**
	(-1.05)	(-0.68)	(0.69)	(2.83)
111th x Female MC	0.366	-0.306	1.097	1.152
	(0.46)	(-0.20)	(0.79)	(0.69)
112th x Female MC	-0.0825	0.915	0.318	1.167
	(-0.10)	(0.60)	(0.23)	(0.70)
Party Presidential	-0.00117	-0.0171	0.0106	0.0284*
Vote	(-0.24)	(-1.82)	(1.01)	(2.25)
Terms	-0.0627***	-0.0849***	-0.0788***	-0.0965***
	(-5.48)	(-3.86)	(-3.79)	(-3.88)
Ideological	1.327**	4.618***	3.880***	5.296***
Extremity	(3.25)	(5.90)	(7.85)	(8.95)
Constant	0.525	0.557	-0.958	-1.513
	(1.96)	(1.08)	(-1.44)	(-1.91)
N	2654	2654	2514	2514
Adj. R²	0.054	0.066	0.070	0.122

Table A4. Fundraising Loyalty

	Democrats	Republicans
Female MC	7107.4	38180.7
	(0.12)	(0.34)
101st	-8166.1	12230.2
	(-0.46)	(0.32)
102nd	-4989.9	13433.7
	(-0.28)	(0.35)
103rd	-2759.4	37481.8
	(-0.15)	(0.96)
104th	-9384.8	71455.1
	(-0.47)	(1.90)
105th	19211.0	99033.5**
	(0.96)	(2.61)
106th	11802.1	77947.2*
	(0.59)	(2.05)
107th	58750.2**	114658.4**
	(2.96)	(3.09)
108th	95840.5***	173120.4***
	(4.84)	(4.68)
109th	179229.3***	215134.3***
	(8.93)	(5.90)
110th	211433.4***	205696.7***
	(10.96)	(5.47)
111th	179322.4***	228930.6***
	(9.37)	(5.85)
112th	120689.8***	276330.8***
	(5.73)	(7.43)
101st x Female MC	1385.2	-4431.0
	(0.02)	(-0.03)
102ndx Female MC	6519.6	-13497.4
	(0.09)	(-0.08)
103rd x Female MC	14068.8	-35889.2
	(0.21)	(-0.23)
104th x Female MC	14605.6	-48741.1
	(0.21)	(-0.34)
105th x Female MC	-659.5	-28066.1
	(-0.01)	(-0.20)
106th x Female MC	13162.1	-49914.9
	(0.20)	(-0.35)
107th x Female MC	28664.8	-44745.1
	(0.43)	(-0.32)
108th x Female MC	8143.6	-72692.9
	(0.12)	(-0.53)
109th x Female MC	19998.7	-93649.4
	(0.30)	(-0.69)
110th x Female MC	7170.4	-131876.5
	(0.11)	(-0.95)
111th x Female MC	47954.6	-74133.9
	(0.73)	(-0.55)
112th x Female MC	22926.1	-138904.1
	(0.35)	(-1.02)
Party Presidential Vote	1045.0***	2226.2*
	(3.46)	(2.44)
Terms	8670.3***	10059.3***
	(10.45)	(5.47)
Safe Seat	35101.9***	62258.5***
	(3.52)	(3.55)
Constant	-122099.5***	-243157.3***
	(-6.54)	(-3.79)
N	2923	2714
Adj. R²	0.203	0.072